Category Archives: Ottomans in Crete

The Bombardment of the Aptera Blockhouse, 27th to 31st March 1897.

The following accounts of the engagements which took place around the Aptera blockhouse were written by an unnamed journalist working for the London Evening Standard. The significance of the Aptera blockhouse was that it commanded the approaches to, and the water supply of, Fort Izzeddin. The fort in its turn controlled the entrance to Suda Bay; the anchorage of the International Fleet. The accounts have been lightly editied for clarity, but the original spellings retained.

SHELLS OF THE CAMPERDOWN (FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT) CANEA, April 1 [1897].

Although I telegraphed a tolerably full account of yesterday’s doings, there are a few complimentary details which may still be read with interest. The position at Canea, which scarcely seems to be as well-known abroad as it ought, is as follows. Behind the town is a strip of plain, highly cultivated, once, and in some places still, like a park, with ancient olive groves and peach, cherry, almond, and orange trees, covered with fruit and blossom, whilst the ground is carpeted with grass and flowers. This plain varies in width from a mile to perhaps three or four, being wedge-shaped, with the point at Suda, where the hills reach down to the sea and the base opposite Platania to the west. The Turks had protected it by a chain of blockhouses on the ridge overlooking its entire length of perhaps eight or nine miles, with two fairly strong forts at either end, Soubashy or Boutsonaria to the west, perched high on the summit of a hill above the springs which supply Canea with water, and that of  Izzeddin to the east, low down on a slope about four miles outside Suda. The Greek main camp at Alicanu lies in a hollow visible from Soubashy, at a distance of perhaps ten miles, but the Insurgents have lately massed themselves in considerable force at various points in turn on both sides of the main ridge, surrounding and attacking the blockhouses one after another, until they had almost aII fallen into their hands, leaving only the two principal forts still in possession of the Turks. After the assault and capture of Malaxa and Keratidi they determined to storm Soubashy, but were prevented by the International troops occupying it on the very day which they had intended to commence the attack. They then concentrated all their efforts on Fort Izzeddin, and Monday [29th March] last commenced firing, being, however, kept in check by the shells of an Italian cruiser.

The Admirals then decided to reinforce the Turkish garrison of six hundred men by five hundred mixed troops, the whole force to be under the command of Major Bor. On Tuesday [30th March], however, it was discovered that the insurgents had occupied a ruined monastery and some stonework within a few hundred yards of the Turkish blockhouse above Fort Izzeddin [Aptera].

 Here a short description of the ground is necessary. The Fort is placed about one hundred feet above the sea, and is armed with twelve Krupp, fifteen-centimetre guns, one of eight centimetres, and two Nordenfelts. There was ample ammunition for all except the Nordenfelts, which only had about four hundred rounds. Of all these guns, however, only two were available against a land attack, the Fort having been built to cover the entrance to Suda Bay. About a quarter of a mile off, on the summit of the hill where it begins to slope down to Izzeddin, is a strong blockhouse, with two Krupp guns eight-centimetre guns outside it, and two Nordenfelts within. Each of these forts had three hundred men. The Turks from the blockhouse had thrown up an earthwork about three hundred yards in advance, where they had placed about twenty men. The Insurgents in their monastery were quite close to this post, whilst the main body of them were camped a little further off, behind a very strong old stone wall and a natural rampart of rock. This position was. perhaps, three-quarters of a mile from tie Fort itself, and the slope from the ridge to the sea, especially along the edge of a ravine which cleft the hill side, was sown thick with sharpshooters.

To return to the story after this digression, the Insurgents commenced a night attack on Tuesday [30th March], and were shelled by several of the small ships, and by one or two rounds from the larger vessels, I believe, up till midnight. It is doubtful, however, if the shells did much damage, as the search lights were found to be more useful to the Insurgents than to the defence, and were ordered to be discontinued. The Ardent was fired at directly she turned on her light, and I was shown one of several bullets which struck her. Meanwhile, Major Bor, who had, together with the Austrian Admiral, inspected the position on Tuesday afternoon, expressed his opinion that it was imperatively necessary to drive the Insurgents out of their advanced position and to occupy it, otherwise it was easy for them to concentrate any number of men unseen. He, therefore, proposed that an International force of five hundred should on the next day storm the Insurgent camp, and drew up a plan of operations, whereby the five companies were to advance in line with certain distances between; bayonets were not to be fixed until within two hundred yards of the position, &c.

The Admirals met next morning to consider this plan, but two of them objected to taking the offensive, and, as a matter of fact, even before they had commenced their conference firing was general down at the point.

I rode over to Suda early, but on trying to get a boat to take me down to the scene was met by great reluctance. At last one boatman picked up his rifle and said he would take me if I would use an oar, and off we went. This was soon after eight o’clock, and at that time the forts were firing occasionally, whilst the Turkish frigate and the Ardent seemed to be the most-busy of the others. It took us the best part of an hour ‘s hard rowing to come opposite the fight, but it well worth the trouble. At about nine the Turkish vessel sheered off, and the grey Russian armoured gunboat, the Groziastchy, ranged up to within about three hundred yards of the shore, and, slowly drifting backwards and forwards, proceeded to pour in a most destructive fire, directed principally at wo old stone wall at the head of the ravine, with also an occasional shell at the Monastery where the Greeks had hoisted a flag upon which the Turks had ref trained from firing, until ordered to do so by the Admirals, on the ground that it was a sacred edifice, though long since in ruins. The Russian practice was excellent, every shell bursting against or at the foot of the wall which was finally knocked into a heap of rubbish. The Insurgents, nevertheless, did not seem to care much, and as soon as they were driven from one shelter, they swarmed into another, generally acknowledging any particularly accurate shell by a stiffer volley at the Turks.

The whole of the slope was now covered with Insurgents, lying down mostly and firing at their ease, now and again advancing a short way again to crouch and fire.  From the crest down to the cliff the gorse and grass might also have been on fire, so covered were they with perpetual puffs of smoke, and the rattle of the rifles never ceased its accompaniment to the boom of the guns every minute of so. At about half-past nine the Austrian Tiger, a large armoured cruiser, relieved the Groziastchy with rather heavier metal, though it did not seem to me to make quite such good practice. I do not mention the calibre of the respective guns for fear of making a mistake, but anybody whom it interests can look them up in “Brassey.” [An authorative British illustrated guide to the naval forces of the world.] It was about half-past nine, or perhaps a little later, when a roar from the distance showed that one of the big ships in the bay had joined in, and the glasses told it was the Camperdown, which was lying the farthest out, and consequently the nearest to the fort, although at a distance of nearly four miles. Several of her shells seemed to go over the hill, and probably were very useful there, but one or two (I believe six-inch).

HMS Camperdown in action 31st March 1897. Illustration by courtesy of the artist, Iain Lowe

By about ten o’clock the Tiger and the Groziastchy were hard at it, but with apparently no effect on the morale of the Insurgents, who kept up their fire most gallantly. Though it appeared to me that the Turks had evacuated their advanced earthwork, I should not like to be sure of it, at any rate, beyond that there did not seem to be much damage on either side, and the blockhouse was holding its own comfortably. Probably, however, it was enabled to do this from the manner in which the Insurgents were being harassed by the shells. While I was wondering how long this might continue, a terrific crash shook the air followed by a hissing and groaning overhead, and then by an explosion at the head of the ravine.

The din beggars description, being multiplied a hundred- fold by the mountains on every side, which sent back a splitting echo. This was one of the white twins, familiarly known as “Long Toms,” from the Camperdown barbette. In perhaps less than a minute came a second, also right in the centre of the position. Each shell raised such a dust and smoke, that the actual results could not be made out: but the Insurgents could be seen hurriedly pulling down their two flags, picking up their rifles, covering their heads with their cloaks and disappearing over the ridge. Two more of these monsters completed the rout, and practically put an end to the incident. Nevertheless, a number of sharpshooters remained on the slope after the main body had departed under a couple of shrapnels from the Tiger, which were the last shells fired at a quarter past ten.

As soon as the Insurgent flag was down, about a hundred and fifty Turks sallied forth, and, opening into one long line, advanced over the slope, keeping their formation well, and, as far as I could see, not replying to the fire of the Insurgents who had remained, but who were gradually cleared off, now one and then another jumping up like a hare and making for the ravine, up which he doubtless rejoined his comrades. By half-past ten the Turks had swept the whole hillside and planted their own flags on the Monastery and at the head of the ravine, dancing with delight, and firing their rifles in the air.

The ships, having done their business, steamed slowly out to sea to continue the blockade, and I landed to see the result of the fire. My boatman, however, objected, saying that if we did not return at once he did not know when we should be able to do so, as a head wind had sprung up and was freshening. As it was too great a risk to run the chance of being stranded up the coast, we started back, and after a very weary hour and a-half struggle against the waves, we made the hospitable Revenge, in whose ward-room the whole bombardment was fought over again. Before leaving the fort, however, a general action seemed to have begun afresh, and the Insurgents, if driven off, did not, evidently, consider themselves beaten. The Turks will, nevertheless, be now able probably to hold their own easily, and such was the opinion of the Admirals, who yesterday afternoon abandoned the idea of a mixed occupation, only ordering a Turkish reinforcement. The Turks lost three killed and five wounded The Insurgent loss can only be known later.

Whilst on this subject, I may add that all Turks here, military and common folk, are furious over the Malaxa affair. The military attribute the blame to Edhem Pacha’s having ordered the convoy to return the day before, the other officers declaring that they could easily have revictualled it. They also say that the Commandant never intended to surrender, and his white flag was only a signal for a parley, but that the Cretans at once came down in force, and this more or less surprised him. Even then he only surrendered by the advice given to him, very sensibly, by a newspaper Correspondent, [Mr. Bass, an American Correspondent] who undoubtedly saved the lives of them all.

London Evening Standard. Tuesday 13 April 1897

CANEA, April 2 [1897]

 Some of the Insurgents to-day fired about fifteen rifle shots at the Butsunaria blockhouse, now occupied by a mixed foreign garrison. The guns of the Italian troops fired six shots in reply, and the Insurgents, who appeared to be in considerable force, thereupon retired. The Turkish prisoners of Colonel Vassos will arrive in Canea to-morrow morning. Three Greek prisoners at Akrotiri have been released. The following is a summary of a letter ad- dressed by the Bishop of Canea to the Christian nations of Europe: —

” For a long time this country has shed its blood in the straggle to escape from tyranny, and to unite with Greece. In the name of the safety of the Cretan people, who are the victims of so many massacres, and who are determined to obtain this union, put a stop to the bombardment, and do not oppose their unanimous wish. The Turks, on the other hand, are free to act against the Christians, and are even supported by the Great Powers. The conduct of the Great Towers reduces the Christians to despair. May a better appreciation of the facts bring about a change in their policy. I appeal to the sentiment of justice and liberty of the Christian nations of Europe to lead to a modification of the attitude of their Governments. I also thank those who made common cause with my compatriots, for their cause is the cause of the whole of humanity. (Signed) ” Nicephoros.”

The day before yesterday [31st March], while the Austrian troops were occupying the Tsikalaria Heights, I went with a colleague representing a New York journal to the Malaxa Hill, which commands the whole Aptera Plateau and rises above the blockhouse protecting Fort Izzedin, on the mountain side. Our object was to gain some details from personal inquiry regarding the bombardment of that position. We were well received by the Insurgents, who said that a small party did, in fact, attack and occupy the blockhouse in question. A bombardment first of all from the Turkish men-of-war and then by the guns of the International Fleet forced them to evacuate the position, which was at once occupied by the Ottoman troops.

On the 30th March more than eighty shots were fired by the ships’ guns. Several houses in the adjacent villages were set on fire, and, according to the Insurgents, this was almost entirely the work of the Turkish troops, who have now planted their standard on the ruins of the Aptera Monastery, which is the property of the Patmos Convent. My companion and myself ascended the next ridge, from which we could see a number of houses enveloped in thick smoke. Not a single soldier was visible except near the Monastery.

On returning to the village of Malaxa, we had further talk with the Insurgent leaders. They said they knew nothing of the Proclamation of the Admirals calling upon them to cease hostilities. They added, however, that they would only obey the orders of Greece. The Chiefs were full of loud denunciation of the Great Powers, which wanted to deprive them of the right to fight for their freedom; but they were all prepared to die rather than yield, even though the Greek troops, overborne by the pressure of the Six Powers arrayed against their country, should have to return to the Piraeus. The Insurgents suffered little from the bombardment. Their only loss was two killed and four men very slightly wounded, among whom were two standard bearers, the one a so-called deserter from the Greek Army, M. Chondalis, and the other a Cretan engineer, M. Emmanuel Kilaides.

The day following the bombardment, viz., March 31, another Insurgent was killed. We passed the night in the village of Condopoulos, where we were very hospitably entertained by another Greek deserter, Lieutenant Rizzis. On April I we rode to Alikianu, passing on our way through Panaghia. A Deputy from Sphakia, M. Paliogeorgaki, accompanied us, and on the road we met Prince Mourouzi. The Insurgents at Alikianu talked of the action of the Powers, and of their resolve to die fighting, just in the same way as their comrades at Malaxa. The French cruiser Bugeaud yesterday went round to Suda Bay.

London Evening Standard 3 April 1897.

The Ottoman bombarment of Malaxa 28th February 1897. The elusive truth?

The difficulty of extracting the truth about what was going on in Crete in 1897 is illustrated by the following two articles, each describing the same event. The first was a formal report written by Rear-Admiral Harris, Senior British Naval Officer in Crete, describing a failed attempt by Cretan Christians to capture the Malaxa blockhouse. The second was a report of the same event written by an unnamed British reporter.

‘On Sunday 28th [February] the insurgents, about 200 strong, attacked the blockhouse held by the Turks on the hill near Malaxa. About 11 A.M., the attack having been renewed, the Greeks being in considerable force, the Turkish commander requested permission to open fire from the “Mukaddemi Khair,” [Mukaddeme-i Hayir] which was permitted by the Admirals, as the Greek flag had been much advanced towards the blockhouse, and a spirited attack on it was being made, in defiance of the Proclamation of the Admirals that offensive operations would not be allowed.

The “Mukaddfemi Khair” fired three shells, the first a well-directed one, which had the effect of rapidly clearing the hill-sides.

The cause of the fighting appears to have been due to a Turkish relief party having left Canea during the night to revictual the blockhouse, which had been for some eight or ten days without provisions.

Having succeeded in their object, the party commenced to return, but were observed by the insurgents, who opened heavy fire on them. They, however, succeeded in regaining the Turkish lines, leaving the insurgents making a strong attack on the blockhouse.

As an outcome of this, the villages of Chacalaria and Nerokori were destroyed by fire, but which party was responsible for the incendiarism it is impossible to find out with any degree of certainty.’[1]

Compare with:

‘Some further particulars have arrived regarding the fighting at Malaxa. The block-house there is situated above the village of Trikalaria, and the Christians have been blockading the Turkish garrison for some days, cutting them off from all supplies.

To-day a body of Turks with a detachment of Nizams, or Ottoman regular troops, left Canea with convoy to revictual the fort. The Cretan insurgents disputed the passage of the convoy and attacked the escort. Some of the Turks and Nizams were killed. Turkish frigate thereupon opened fire and threw two shells in the direction of the insurgent force. By order of the foreign war-vessels the Turkish man-of-war then ceased firing. In the end the Turkish convoy had to retire to Canea. The fighting between the besieged garrison and the Cretans, however, continues. The villages of Trikalaria and Nerokouro were set on fire by Bashi-Bazouks.’[2]

 Ignoring the relatively minor matters of the number of shells fired by the Mukaddeme-i Hayir and the fact that it wasn’t a ‘frigate’ but an iron-clad battle ship, two main issues are highlighted by the differing reports. In the one from the British Admiral Harris, he makes it clear that the Mukaddeme-i Hayir opened fire with the permission of the Admirals and makes no reference to the vessel being ‘ordered’ to cease firing. The complete opposite is implied in the newspaper report. This omits the fact that the Ottoman vessel had the permission of the Powers to commence firing and suggests that it only cease when ordered to do so by the Admirals. (One can only imagine the feelings of the Captain of the Mukaddeme-i Hayir, having to obtain permission from foreign Powers to open fire in support of Ottoman troops, being attacked on what was still then de jure Ottoman territory, by forces rebelling against Ottoman rule.)

The second point to note is the attribution of blame for the burning of the two villages. Admiral Harris states that it’s impossible to correctly allocate the blame for staring the fires; the St James Gazette reporter is adamant that the fire was started by Bashi-Bazouks – Ottoman, Cretan-Muslim, irregular forces.

What is also of interest is that Harris’ account would have been read by relatively few, albeit possibly influential, people, whereas the newspaper account was widely circulated and syndicated in British newspapers of the day.

So, which one is telling the ‘truth’?

Feth i Bülend sister ship to Mukaddeme-i Hayr (1869)
Mukaddeme-i Hayir during refit in Constantinople in 1895.

(Several weeks later the Mukaddeme-i Hayir was again in action, again bombarding the insurgents.)


[1] Parliamentary Command paper C.8429. Turkey. No. 9 (1897). Reports on the situation in Crete.  Inc. 2. p.8. Rear Admiral Harris to Admiral J.O. Hopkins, 4 March 1897.

[2] St James’s Gazette – Monday 01 March 1897.

Artillery on Crete, 1897-1898

While one of the main focuses of the Governments of the European Powers in seeking to pacify Crete was the provision of sufficient naval forces and infantry to keep the warring factions apart, they were also faced with the fact that the Cretan Christians also had artillery at their disposal. This was highlighted when Rear-Admiral Harris, the then Senior British Naval Officer on Crete, referring to the evacuation of Greek troops from Crete in May 1897, reported:

‘The question of artillery has given much trouble. It was obviously most undesirable to have guns left behind in the hands of the insurgents when the whole object of the Powers is to pacify the island. After much trouble and insistence on the part of the Admirals, four of the six guns stated by the Greeks to belong entirely to the Cretans are to be embarked with the Greek troops, the other two are said to be on Akrotiri, and the Admirals have made a peremptory condition that they also shall be taken away.

The western end of the island will then, I believe, be free from insurgent artillery; though we know that there are four to six 7-centim. Krupp guns to the eastward, we cannot immediately connect them with the Greek troops or Government, though there is not much doubt that they indirectly or otherwise provided them.’[1]

In the end, the Royal Navy oversaw the evacuation of 6 field guns, 12 horses, 53 mules and 233 cases of artillery ammunition.[2]

(An internet search suggests that although described by the British as 7cm (70mm) there wasn’t a 70mm Krupps gun at this time: the pieces in question could possibly either have been 65/66mm guns or 60mm mountain guns. To add to the confusion, the Ottoman Empire was, at this time, the world’s largest importer of Krupp guns, purchasing 3,943 Krupp guns of various types between 1854 and 1912.[3])

To counter the threat of Greek/Cretan Christian artillery, in the early stages of the Intervention, both the Powers and the Ottoman military supplied artillery to the island.

Ottoman field artillery beneath what appear to be an Italian flag.

Ottoman field artillery beneath what appear to be an Italian flag.

An illustration from an Italian magazine shows Ottoman artillery beneath what is apparently an Italian flag.

 

 

Italian Guns Suda Bay April 1897

Italian Guns Suda Bay April 1897

 

It would appear that the French forces also had access to artillery, whether their own, Ottoman or that landed from H.M.S Anson. Captain Egerton recorded that:

“Last night [10th April 1897] at 6.30 p.m. the International Force at Soubaschi fired 5 shots from the 9 pdr. The fire–eating Perignon[?] who commands will someday if he irritates these fellows too much, bring Vassos about his ears – Vassos’ outposts are only about a mile away. – G.E. “[4]

In addition to the Royal Artillery Mountain Battery stationed in Crete in the early stages of the Intervention, following the events in Candia in September 1896 the Royal Navy reinforced the town, landing field artillery.

Royal Navy field guns being landed at Candia October 1898

Royal Navy field guns being landed at Candia October 1898

 

 

 

[1] ADM 116/92 Rear-Admiral Harris, Suda Bay, to Admiral Sir J. Hopkins, C in C Mediterranean Fleet, Malta. 23 May 1897

[2] ADM116/116 Captain Sir R. Poole, HMS Hawke, to Rear-Admiral Harris. 20 May 1897.

[3] Donald J. Stocker, Jonathan A. Grant. Girding for Battle: The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003, pp.31-32.

[4] NAM 6807-171. Diary of the detachment 1st BN. Seaforth Highlanders at Canea Crete During the early days of the international Occupation 1897.

 

The Ottomans leave

Following the riots in Candia in September 1898, the decision was finally taken to remove all Ottoman troops and officials from Crete. After an ultimatum issued by the Admirals controlling Crete was issued to the Ottoman authorities on the 4th October, the Porte prevaricated but on 23rd October the evacuation began, only to be halted by the 28th with some 8,000 Ottoman troops having left.[1] The price for this delay, brought about to avoid Ottoman embarrassment during by the Kaiser’s visit to Constantinople, was to be high in terms of lost Ottoman prestige. At the insistence of the British, in punishment for the delay in evacuation, the Sultan’s flag was to be hauled down in Canea and all troops were to leave the island by 5th November; in the event of them failing to do so the Powers would take steps to remove them and make the Porte pay indemnities for any damages caused in their removal.[2]

Although The British Commander Major-General Chermside had reported on 4th November ‘Have taken over the keys of the fortress and civil and military administration,’[3] and British Consul Sir Alfred Biliotti on the 5th that ‘This morning British Authorities have assumed civil administration taken over police prisons and taken possession of Customs indirect contributions and dime,’[4] on 6th November there were still some 500 Ottoman troops left in Candia and steps were accordingly taken to ‘turn them out.’

The  Northumberland Fusiliers took over the barracks without difficulty, although one elderly Ottoman Colonel ‘a grey haired old man, refused to clear out without [a] show of force, so eventually he was marched down in the middle of a party of the Rifle Brigade to the harbour.’ A similar  story was played out later that day in the Artillery barracks where they removed ‘60 Turks under another ancient Colonel about 65 years of age, who absolutely refused to budge and said he had received no orders.’[5] Eventually all Ottoman troops and officials, complete with wives families and baggage, were escorted to the harbour and by the evening of 6th November;

‘Thanks to the efforts of the Royal Navy, who worked all night, under the electric light, the Turks, their horses, their women, their children and all their extraordinary belongings, were all shipped off to Salanka [sic] in an incredibly short space of time.’[6]

Royal Navy sailors 'assist' the departure of Ottoman troops

Royal Navy sailors ‘assist’ the departure of Ottoman troops The caption reads; The Evacuation of Crete – British Bluejackets Clearing Out The Turks ‘Bag and Baggage.’

The Ottoman presence on Crete, which had commenced in 1645, was thus effectively terminated.

Ottoman Troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898.

Ottoman Troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898.

Ottoman Troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898

Ottoman Troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898

expulsion-of-ottoman-troops

Ottoman troops departing (Suda bay?) November 1898.

French authorities lowering the Ottoman flag; Irapetra 1898. (The date on the postcard may be in correct; most of the Ottoman troops had left Crete by 6 November.)

French authorities lowering the Ottoman flag; Irapetra 1898. (The date on the postcard may be in correct; most of the Ottoman troops had left Crete by 6 November.)

Ottoman Troops departing Irpetra. 1898.

Ottoman Troops departing Irpetra. 1898.

 

In reality however, the Ottoman military presence did not finally come to an end until several months later; a few men stayed behind to supervise the shipping of Ottoman munitions, and arguments were still continuing up until December as to the rank of the most senior Ottoman officer the Admirals would allow to superintend the operation.

References:

[1] Şenişik, The Transformation of Ottoman Crete, 227.

[2] Ibid. 224.

[3] ADM 116/93, Vol. 2. Telegram No. 30 Chermside – no addressee. 4 November 1898.

[4] Ibid. Telegram No. 107. Biliotti to Constantinople Embassy, 5 November 1898.

[5] NFRA. St. George’s Gazette, November 30 1898, p. 183.

[6] Ibid. December 31 1898, p. 199.

[7] Turkey No. 1, 1899. No. 102. Noel to Admiralty, 1 December 1898.

An Azerbaijani take on Crete.

The matter of Crete in the late 1890s wasn’t just of interest to the immediate players on the island, to Greece, the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe; it was also of interest to those within, and on, the borders of Iran and Russia.

The cartoon below, “No need to get too hot”, was published in the Azerbaijani satirical magazine “Molla Naasreddin.” The cartoon shows Britain, Russia and, possibly, Italy, forcing the Ottoman Empire to take a shower by a sign saying, Krid Melelesi,  which appears to translate from Turkish into the phrase ‘The Matter of Crete’. The image is undated but the magazine was set up in 1906 so it presumably relates to events post that date.

'No need to get too hot.'

‘No need to get too hot.’

Further details of the magazine, which apparently took a similar approach to the politics and religion of the era and area as French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, can be found at; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31640643

 

The evacuation of Kandanos, 1897

On 7th March 1897 a force consisting of 200 British sailors and marines, 100 French , 100 Austrian and 75 Russians, landed  on the south west coast of Crete. Accompanied by Sir Alfred Biliotti, the  British  Consul, their task was to evacuate some 1600 Cretan Muslims and 450 Ottoman soldiers from the village of Kandanos in south west Crete, then under siege by Christian Cretans supported by Greek manned artillery. (It should be noted that the actual dates on which the events in the evacuation occurred are somewhat difficult to determine. The main source of information is Sir Alfred Biliotti who although he was present throughout, was less than clear in his dispatches; particularly when it came to putting dates in his narrative! The dates given here was obtained from various accounts, including the log of  H. M. S. Rodney; in deference to the log keeping traditions of the Royal Navy, these dates are preferred to those given by Biliotti. Similarly, the numbers of evacuees varies from account to account.) The village of Kandanos was at this time, the centre of the Cretan Muslim population of Selinos district, their numbers having been increased by an influx of refugees seeking sanctury and the protection of the Ottoman garrison following the massacre of their co-religionists in Sarakina the previous month.

Attempts by the European Consuls and the Council of Admirals to negotiate the safe passage for the Muslims out of kandanos were thwarted by the Greek Vice-Consul and the Greek military commanders on Crete* and finally the decision was taken to evacuate them, if necessary using force for their protection. The base for the rescue operation was the then semi-derelict village Selino Kastelli, modern Paleochora.

Selino Kastelli ( Paleochora) Gerola

Selino Kastelli c 1900-1902

Landing at Sellino Kastelli (Paleochora) ILN 10 April 1897.

Midshipmen from HMS Rodney who took part in the evacuation of Kandanos. Penny Illustrated Press 10 April 1897

Landing at Sellino Kastelli (Paleochora) ILN 10 April 1897.

Stopping overnight in the village of Spaniakos, where a reporter from The Times who had been travelling with the insurgents, recorded that the French Officers commandeered the mosque while the British had to make do with a small harem, on 8th March, the expedition reached Kandanos without serious incident. The following morning, the column escorted the Muslims back down to Selino-Kastelli, collecting the garrison of the fort at Spaniakos as well, and in spite of the refugees being robbed of nearly all their possessions en route, managed to effect the evacuation without serious bloodshed. On arrival at Selino-Kastelli that evening, the insurgents fired on the column, but they were eventually driven off by fire from the Russian field gun. The following morning, 10th March, the Christians again fired on the troops on the beach; this time fire was returned by the European troops and the warships in the bay, the rebels eventually being cleared by a bayonet charge. No Europeans were injured in the exercise but four insurgents were killed and sixteen wounded.

Biliotti reported to the Foreign Office::

‘Successfully rescued to-day, but not without the greatest peril, 523 men, 1,047 women and children, and 340 soldiers from Candamos [sic]. Picked (up) on way back 112 soldiers from Spaniako blockhouse. Natives of Candamos embarked. We are now embarking Mussulman refugees at Selino Castelli [sic], about 1,000.’

Ottoman Fortress, Spaniakos

Ottoman Fortress, Spaniakos

The French troops are reported as having spent the night in a local notable’s harem; the British in the local mosque.

Spaniakos Mosque

Spaniakos Mosque.

The Spaniakos mosque was destroyed after the evacuation of Cretan Muslims from the area. (Further details of the area around Spaniakos can be found here.)

Royal Navy Guard at Spaniakos (ILN 10 April 1897.

Kandanos 3 April 97 ILN

British sailors leading column of refugees from Kandanos. Illustration by Melton-Prior.

Following the evacuation, the refugees arrived in Canea aboard the various European vessels. Some would stay in Canea, some went to the Turkish mainland, but few ever returned to Kandanos, and those who did were uprooted again in the 1923 population exchange.

Cretan Muslim refugees from Kandanos arriving in Canea. March 1897.

Sailors from HMS Rodney who took part in the Kandanos evacuation.

During the operation several maps and sketches of the area were produced, apparently by French naval officers.

Area of Operations. 5th to 10th March 1897.

International troops landed at Selino Kastelli and then proceed to Kandanos via Spaniakos and Kakodiki.

Disposition of International troops Selino Kastelli, 10th March 1897.

View of the hills above Selino Kastelli and the disposition of International troops on their return from Kandanos. 10th March 1897.

The outline of the hills above the village appears to suggest that the sketch was made from a viewpoint in the south west bay.

Hills above Paleochora, February 2016.

Hills above Paleochora, February 2016. The route to Kandanos and Spaniakos is through the valley on the right hand side of the photograph.

Evidence of the use of Gras rifles, the type used by the Cretan insurgents, has been found near the site of the final encounter.

Gras bullet found in Paleochora near the site of the engagement.

Gras bullet found in Paleochora near the site of the engagement.

More details of the bullet can be found here.

The evacuation marked the effective end of the Ottoman presence in south west Crete, an event marked on a plaque erected on the wall of the old castle in Paleochora in 2020.

Plaque marking the end of the Ottoman presence in Selino.

The text in English reads:

‘After 374 years of Venitian slavery and 244 years of Turkish, here on 1 March 1897 at the end of the revolution of 1896-1897 in Selino, the revolutionary liberation flag of Selino was raised. Here on 1 December 1913 with the union of Crete with Greece, the Greek flag was raised.’

1897 Monument

A futher monument is located outside the old school in the hamlet of Beilitika, 5km south of Kandanos, marking one of the sites where Biliotti negotiated the release of the Muslim hostages. The text reads:

‘At Beilitika in 1897 a surrender treaty was signed by the Turks of Selino who were surrounded in Kandanos and we were free after three centuries of slavery.’

  • Historical Account of the International Occupation Of Crete. Captain J.F. Cazenove, 81st Infantry Regiment. 1908. Service Historique del la Defense, Vincennes. Unpublished document transcribed and edited by J-P Destelle, 2019.

Many thanks to Bob Tait for supplying the illustration of the Spaniakos mosque,  to Michalis Adamtziloglou for the translation of the plaques and to jean-Pierre Destelle for access to Captain Cazenove’s account. .

All pals together…for a while

International forces in Canea. April 1897.

International forces in Canea. April 1897.

The British army  troops are from 1/Seaforth Highlanders, in Crete from March 1897 to November that year. It’s difficult to make out from the photograph but given the number of Naval officers in the background, it’s more than likely that there are British marines and sailors in the shot.

German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman troops. Crete c.1897.

German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman troops. Crete c.1897.

The postcard is stamped as being posted in 1904 in Canea. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians left Crete in early 1898 and the Ottomans were evicted in late 1898, so there’s a good chance the photographs date from 1897/1898. probably taken in the Canea/Suda Bay area.

 

Ottomans Evacuate Crete

On October 4th 1898 the Council of European Admirals, then effectively ruling Crete, gave the Ottoman authorities one month in which to evacuate all Ottoman troops from the island. The Porte having earlier the previous year, and with great reluctance, accepted that Crete was ultimately to be an Autonomous State, agreed to the evacuation in principle, but objected to both the time table and the detailed terms; the Sultan wanting to retain a small force to guard the Ottoman flag. From British records, it’s clear that the various European governments were prepared to compromise to some extent on the Porte’s response, provided that sooner rather than later, the Ottomans left.

 
However, the Admirals were adamant that if the Ottomans didn’t all evacuate by the given date, after an ultimatum issued forty eight hours beforehand, all ‘…Turkish authorities and forces [would] be considered as enemies.’ If compulsion should prove necessary, the Admirals would commence by attacking and destroying Fort Izzedin and sinking all Ottoman ships in Suda Bay. If the Porte did not immediately submit, ‘…operations will be continued at Canea, Hieraptra, Spinalonga, Kissamo, and Rethymo; but, in consequence of recent events at Candia [the riots of 6th September 1898] Admirals have not the same scruples, and consider that action there should take place at the same time as Suda.’

 
By way of preparation for an attack on Candia plans were drawn up which would involve the British forces outside the town, if not previously withdrawn into the town, to concentrate and, in a delicious irony, supported by Cretan Christian insurgents who the British had originally come to suppress, withdraw to the coast where they would be re-embarked. The action to be taken In Candia would include the bombardment of the town, and to this end, detailed maps were drawn up showing the likely fields of fire covered by the guns of the Royal Navy and the British infantry.

Map of Candia showing fields of fire.

Map of Candia showing fields of fire.

In the event, in spite of last minute delay and prevarications on the part of the Ottoman authorities, the evacuation in the British secteur took place on 5th and 6th November 1898, without the use of force being necessary – other than in the case of one elderly Ottoman Colonel ’… a grey haired man, [who] refused to clear out without a show of force, so eventually […] was marched down in the middle of a party of the Rifle Brigade to the harbour.’

Ottoman troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898

Ottoman troops departing Suda Bay. November 1898

The delay in meeting the November 4th deadline, albeit by a day or two, did however, have consequences. The Ottoman flag, which under the terms of the settlement granting Crete Autonomy was supposed to remain flying, was hauled down in Candia and wasn’t raised again until later that month. When it was finally reinstated, in a clear demonstration of where the power on the island actually lay, it was raised and protected by European troops, while, simultaneously, a proclamation was issued guaranteeing European protection to Cretan Muslims.
However, while technically, the last Ottoman troops left Crete on 6th November, a few men did remain behind to supervise the shipping of Ottoman stores and munitions and as late as December that year, arguments were still taking place as to the rank of the Ottoman soldiers who would be allowed to remain; the Ottomans wanting to send a Colonel, the Admirals insisting that no one over the rank of Captain be allowed to remain.

Ottoman Guns being removed from Candia. 1898/1899

Ottoman Guns being removed from Candia. 1898/1899

Inter-communal violence… good for chocolate sales.

Bashi-bazouks mutilating corpses. 7 March 1897.

Bashi-bazouks mutilating corpses. 7th March 1897.

Bashibazouks Akrotiri 1897 propaganda

Reverse of card.

Shown above are both sides of a trading card purporting to show Cretan Muslim Bashi – bazouks – irregular volunteers – mutilating the bodies of Cretan Christians in Canea in March 1897. The attacks on Cretan Christians which took place at the time, and subsequent the burning of a large part of the capital, Canea, were the incidents that lead to the beginning of the European Intervention on Crete; the landing of European sailors and marines.

Seemingly, in the late 1890s, graphic depictions of violence were deemed suitable for the selling of chocolate: The cards were issued by a French chocolate company; one originally founded by Trappist monks.

More rather violent chocolate cards, followed by some pretty birds, 1/3 down the page here.

 

 

Not so reliable allies

Upon arrival on Crete in February 1897, the International forces were, in effect, reluctant allies of the Ottoman Empire. The European objective at that time was to bring a halt to the inter-communal strife brought about by the Cretan Christian insurrection and to prevent the annexation of Crete by Greece.

While part of the European peace keeping strategy was to proclaim a blockade of the island to prevent both Greek and Ottoman reinforcements arriving, and hence exacerbating an already volatile situation, they still had to co-operate with the existing Ottoman garrison of the island. This garrison consisted to two elements, regular Ottoman Army units and locally raised volunteers; Bashi-bazouks, a term originally applied to irregular mercenary troops within the feudal Ottoman Empire.
The regular Ottoman soldiers on Crete, though often treated with disdain by the British, had at least a recognised, and recognisable, command structure. However, the Bashi-bazouks on Crete at this time, in part raised, armed and paid for by the Ottoman authorities as a sort of Muslim home guard, and formally on the ration strength of the Ottoman army, were much less formal and, apparently, nearly totally undisciplined.

Bashi Bazouks 1896. Note the regular Ottoman troops in the background giving the lie to the suggestion that bashi bazouks were merely groups of armed Cretan Muslims.

Bashi-bazouks 1896. Note the presence of regular Ottoman troops,  giving the lie to the suggestion that Bashi- bazouks were merely groups of armed Cretan Muslims.

Bashi bazouks, Fort izeddin

March 1897. Romanticised view of Bashi-bazouks. Fort Izeddin, Suda bay, in the background.

BazibazouksWith the events of 6th September 1898 any pretense that the Bashi-bazouks were in any sense allies of the British had gone, and the murders carried out by them in Candia, coupled with the failure of the regular Ottoman troops to take action to stop them, resulted in the Ottoman eviction from the island.