Soldiers who died in Crete were usually buried in a churchyard or cemetery corresponding to their religion. Most Protestant British soldiers are memorialised in a cemetery within, but walled off from, the Orthodox church of of Agios Konstantinos and Agia Eleni in Iraklion and their Catholic colleagues are buried in the Catholic Churchyard St John the Baptist, also in Iraklion. Most French Catholics are buried in the Catholic churchyard of the monastery of St Francis in Canea, the majority of Russian Orthodox buried in the Greek Orthodox churchyard of Agios Konstantinos and Agia Eleni in Rethymno, the Russian/Polish Catholics in a separate, Catholic, graveyard across the road from their Orthodox colleagues.
However, two British soldiers, Corporal W. Ward, Army Service Corps, who died in Canea 28th October 1898 and Private H. J. Sharp, Royal Marine Light Infantry from H.M.S.Thetis, who died on 24th May 1898, are buried in the Orthodox churchyard of Agia Fotini, Canea 731 33, the Canea Municipal Cemetery.
While it is of course not impossible that both men were members of the Greek Orthodox church, it is unlikely, in particular since their names do not appear to indicate they were anything other than British in origin.
The events surrounding the raising of the Greek flag by Spiros Kayales (also spelled as Kagailes or Kayaledakis) during the bombardment of Agios Elias on the Akrotiri peninsula above Canea on 21 February 1897 are a well known story in Crete. In brief, the narrative goes that when the Greek flag, raised by Cretan Christian insurgents, was knocked down during the bombardment of the position by European warships, Kayales raised it up and kept it flying, using his body as a flagpole. The story goes on that the European Admirals, seeing Kayales’ bravery ceased firing. A slightly different version is told here. A further British version of the event was given by the correspondent of the Globe, writing from Canea on 22nd February 1897, and published on 4th March of that year.
‘Ever since Friday February 19, the Greeks and insurgents encamped near the village of Korakies had been pressing towards Canea and firing promiscuously. As I have shown [previously] in this letter, they received a stern warning on Friday. In spite of this they played the same game on this Sunday afternoon, and by firing on Canea and its neighbourhood not only set the Powers at defiance, but also endangered the lives of the marines who were on shore. It was an unpleasant business, but the Admirals, who were responsible for their men, were obliged to actively interfere. All the afternoon shots were heard behind Canea – the insurgents were, apparently potting at everything they could see. The Admirals got tired of this and at length decided to act.
All ships which had a clear range were ordered to fire on the village of Korakies, on the east, above Halepa. The Greeks were in force there behind the hill. At 5p.m. the bombardment began. Bang! Went the Austrian “Maria Theresa” and the others followed suit. The ships firing were:- “Revenge”, “Dryad, “Harrier” (English), “Maria Theresa” (Austrian); “Alexander II” (Russian); “Kaiserine Augusta” (German). The Italian and French ships did not fire, not having a clear range. We had a perfect view of the shooting, the village being at the top of a hill only 4,000 yards away. Shrapnel shell burst all over the place. The Greek flag was, after two minutes, hauled down, but the firing did not cease for another three minutes, when it stopped by general signal.
No troops could be seen during this fusillade, except when the flag was hauled down; then one bold man took away both flag and staff. Directly the firing ceased, however, we were amazed to see hundreds of figures appear over the brow of the hill, and once more the Greek flag was hoisted. Nothing was done by us to stop them, and the flag was left in possession. I do not suppose the firing did much damage. The village was already in ruins, and the troops had plenty of shelter in the rocky ground.
The following is a rough estimate of the firing output:- “Dryad” 10 rounds of 4.7 inch shell; “Harrier” five rounds; “Alexander II.” Four rounds; “Kaiserin Augusta” six rounds; making altogether 28 rounds of 4.7 inch shell.
The English yacht “Inva” was unpleasantly close to the line of fire, and was nearly hit by a shot from either the Austrian or the Russian ship – reports differ. The shell- a time-fuse- exploded just outside the muzzle of the gun, and its bullets ploughed up the water all around the yacht. She rapidly shifted her billet. The “Revenge” fired three shots uncomfortably near the “Barfleur,” right across her bows.
The shrapnel shells bursting on the hill top made a very pretty display, and the English firing was fairly good, but the men’s hearts were not in the job.’
This version, albeit observed from 4,000 yards away, suggests that Kayales simply removed the flag and flagpole.
Why does this matter? In many ways it doesn’t. Undoubtedly Spiros Kayales was a very brave man to venture anywhere near the flag during the bombardment, and nobody would dispute his bravery or that he took some action to protect the flag. What the reports of the incident show is the difficulty of relying on eyewitness accounts of any historical event to determine what is the “truth”.
The British observers, at least one of whom was on board one of the ships firing, viewing the scene from 4,000 yards away, did not, apparently, see him do anything other than pull down, or retrieve the flag. The Cretan observers, nearer the event but in the middle of an intense three or four minutes of bombardment by shrapnel shells, apparently saw him raise the flag, using his body as a flagpole.
In one version of the event he is simply a figure on a hill-top, in another version he is part of national foundation story. The reader chooses.
The file below lists all British miliitary deaths, discovered to date, that occured during the British involvement in the European Intervention in Crete between 1897 and 1913. A lot of the original work that went into producing this list was carried out by Ron Phillips during the 1980s and is included by with his permission. The list is intended to be freely available for use or reproduction, although an acknowledgement and a link back to this source would be nice!
The work on updating the list is continuing and any additions/corrections/comments would be most gratefully received.
Memorial Wall to British Military Dead.
Agios Konstantinos and Eleni, 42 Odos Knossou, Iraklion.
In 1905 the Theriso rebellion broke out on Crete. Named after the village outside Canea where the rebels initially made their headquarters, the rebellion was aimed as much against the autocratic rule of Prince George of Crete, the High Commissioner appointed by the European Powers, as it was in favour of the unification of Crete with Greece. For the most part, in the British controlled secteur of the island, area around Candia (Iraklion), there was little confrontation between the rebels and the British; on the few occasions that the rebels, attacked British troops the rebels came of second best. In most cases, the rebels withdrew, suffering a number of men killed and more wounded, and in only one instance are the British recorded as withdrawing from an engagement.[1]
One encounter which took place outside the British secteur occurred in Candanos (Kandanos) in Selino district, and, unusually, photographic evidence exists recording the encounter (albeit with an incorrect date, the photograph being taken on 10th or 11th April).
International troops and Cretan gendarmes in Candanos, 1905. British Rifleman on extreme left of picture.
In a despatch to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, on 13 April 1905, the British Consul-General Esme Howard reported that they had received word in Canea on Saturday 8th April, that following the arrest by the Cretan gendarmerie of 13 rebels in a café in Candanos, the gendarmerie post there had been placed under siege by some 150 rebels who were demanding the release of their colleagues. A request from the gendarmes for assistance was followed shortly by a letter to the Commandant of the gendarmerie, Captain Monaco, written by Jean [Giannis?] Foumis, the brother of C[onstantine] Foumis the leader of the Candanos rebels, begging the authorities to take steps to prevent bloodshed. According to Howard, the steps Jean Foumis thought ought to be taken were that the gendarmes should be given orders to hand the prisoners back to the rebels.
Konstantine Foumis
At a meeting that evening, the European Consuls agreed that ‘…it was a matter of the greatest importance not to allow this gendarmerie station to fall into the hands of the insurgents, since that would have given an impetus to the movement, and we believed that the sudden action of the international troops would have a wholesome deterrent effect on the insurgents for the future.’
It was agreed to ask Captain A. H. Christian of H.M.S. Juno, an Eclipse Class Protected Cruiser then on station off Crete, to take a party of 100 or so international troops to Poliochora sic., or Selino Castelli, to bring back the insurgent prisoners. While Captain Christian was prepared to do so, a problem arose in that the French Consul insisted that every one of the Powers be represented.[2]
H. M. S. Juno 1901.
This presented Howard with a dilemma. British troop numbers on Crete were, by this time, very low, consisting at the end of March, of 11 officers and 400 men[3] and both the Foreign Office and the European Consuls on Crete had no desire to get the forces of the Powers involved in what was essentially an internal power struggle any more than was absolutely necessary to maintain order. British troops in particular were not to be permitted to take part in any military activities in the interior of the island.
To add to his problems, the two most senior British army officers on the island at that time were Captain Johnson, commanding the Candia secteur, and Captain Martin, commanding a half company of the 1/King’s Royal Rifles, the token British force in the international secteur around Canea, and any mixed international column would undoubtedly be commanded by an officer of higher rank. Whether British officers should be allowed to come under the command of a ‘foreign’ officer was a very contentious issue, having already arisen shortly beforehand when Captain Martin’s men had been sent with an international column with the intention of ‘…impressing the natives with the unanimity of the Powers in their action for the reestablishment of order.’[4] The control issue was also complicated by the demand by Prince George some time earlier that British troops on the island come under his command if necessary, a demand that was refused.[5]
In the event, Howard consulted with Captains Johnson and Martin and it was agreed that one sergeant and five men from the Canea detachment, then at Kalyves supervising and protecting the ballot station there, should embark on the Juno with the international column. (Howard in his report sought to absolve the two officers of any blame should the War Office object to the sending of the troops.)[6]
Under the command of Captain Lugli of the Italian contingent, 40 Italians, 40 French, 6 English and 4 Russian troops, accompanied by some 20 gendarmes, set sail from Suda Bay on H.M.S. Juno at 4 p.m. on 9th April. Steaming slowly so as not to arrive at night, the force arrived at Paleochora at 4.30 a.m. on the morning of the 10th April. The column left Paleochora at 6.15 a.m. and made their way up the valley the 15 or so km to Candanos without incident – although a group of men flying a Greek flag were seen and two shots heard, they were not apparently fired at the troops.
On reaching Candanos they were informed that the rebels had repeatedly called upon the gendarmes to release their prisoners, but the gendarmes had refused to do so. It also appeared that a considerable number of rebels, under Konstantine Manos, had converged on the village, apparently with the aim of storming the gendarme station and freeing the prisoners. However, the arrival of the international column forestalled any such attempt.[7]
The following morning, 11th April, the column returned to Paleochora, taking with them twelve prisoners, one being left behind with his family after having sustained a serious wound. The records make no reference to the local gendarmes being evacuated and given the Consuls’ desire to maintain a gendarmerie presence in the principle gendarmerie stations wherever possible in order to maintain a semblance of law and order and discourage the population from joining the rebels, it’s quite possible that they remained.[8] The Juno arrived back in Canea at 5.30 p.m. and in spite of a noisy demonstration on the quayside which went on late into the night, the prisoners were taken to the town goal. However, the Commandant of the gendarmerie, fearing that an attempt would be made to rescue them, asked Howard to arrange for their transportation to Fort Izzeddin, at the mouth of Suda Bay, and, on the morning of the 12th April, they were taken there by H. M. S. Juno.[9]
Nothing more appears in the British archives relating to the fate of the prisoners, but in all likelihood, they were freed in the amnesty that was announced in the aftermath of the revolt.
There were, however, quite possibly consequences as far as the British army was concerned. The War Office may well have been less than impressed that British contingent was not headed up by an officer. On the 12th April, only the day before Howard’s despatch announcing the expedition to Candanos, Howard had been told by the Foreign Office:
‘The War Office consider that no detachment of British troops, no matter how small, should be detailed to take part in military operations unless accompanied by a British Officer. Please inform Officer Commanding British detachment [Captain Johnson] accordingly.’[10]
The copy of that despatch in the National Archive file is of the out-going telegram and while it is timed at 9p.m., there is no indication in the file of the time it was received in Canea. If it wasn’t received and passed on to Howard before the discussions concerning the make-up of the British contingent, he could plead ignorance in sending a party commanded by a sergeant. However, if it was received and its contents transmitted to Captain Johnson, this was clearly a breach of orders, both on the part of Howard and of Johnson. This might explain why, in his report, Howard accepts the responsibility for sending the party without an officer. Unfortunately, the files are silent on the matter.
(The large building in the photograph is what remains of the castle Kandanos after the evacuation of Ottoman troops in 1897. The smaller building on the left is part of the current elementary school. The building on the right is the former County Court. The main building was the Government House (Seragio), in which lived the last Governor of Selinos Province, Saddam Genitsarakis; Genitsarakis later served as Mayor of Chania and Minister of Public Order of the Cretan State. Between 1897 and the Second World War, the site, which backed onto a large Muslim cemetery (Mezaria), was occupied by the Gendarmerie station. The site is now occupied by the Kandanos Town Hall and Municipal Offices.)
[1] WO32 7543. Telegram G.O.C. Egypt to Secretary of State for War, 20 August 1905; Telegram No.150, Esme Howard to Foreign Office 15 August 1905; Crete Confidential No.224, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Panton to C.S.O. Cairo, 18 July 1905.
[2] The National Archive (Hereafter TNA) TNA WO32 7541. Telegram No.40. Howard to Marquess of Lansdown 13 April 1905.
[3] TNA WO32 7541 Memo, Register No. 026/34. Col. W. R. Robertson, General Staff, to Director of Military Operations. 26 March 1905
[4] TNA WO32 7541. Telegram No.35 Howard to Marquess of Lansdowne 4 April 1905.
[5] TNA WO32 7538. Memo F4/185 J. A. Sanderson, Secretary of State for War, to Army Council, 11 June 1904.
[7] According to the latter part of Howard’s report the rebels’ leader in Candanos was C[onstantine] Manos; according to the earlier part it was Constantine Foumis. TNA WO32 7541. Telegram No.40. Howard to Marquess of Lansdown. 13 April 1905.
[8] TNA WO32 7541. Telegram No.41. Inclosure 1 in No 1, Captain Monaco to Esme Howard, 13 April 1905.
The following accounts of the engagements which took place around the Aptera blockhouse were written by an unnamed journalist working for the London Evening Standard. The significance of the Aptera blockhouse was that it commanded the approaches to, and the water supply of, Fort Izzeddin. The fort in its turn controlled the entrance to Suda Bay; the anchorage of the International Fleet. The accounts have been lightly editied for clarity, but the original spellings retained.
SHELLS OF THE CAMPERDOWN (FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT) CANEA, April 1 [1897].
Although I telegraphed a tolerably full account of yesterday’s doings, there are a few complimentary details which may still be read with interest. The position at Canea, which scarcely seems to be as well-known abroad as it ought, is as follows. Behind the town is a strip of plain, highly cultivated, once, and in some places still, like a park, with ancient olive groves and peach, cherry, almond, and orange trees, covered with fruit and blossom, whilst the ground is carpeted with grass and flowers. This plain varies in width from a mile to perhaps three or four, being wedge-shaped, with the point at Suda, where the hills reach down to the sea and the base opposite Platania to the west. The Turks had protected it by a chain of blockhouses on the ridge overlooking its entire length of perhaps eight or nine miles, with two fairly strong forts at either end, Soubashy or Boutsonaria to the west, perched high on the summit of a hill above the springs which supply Canea with water, and that of Izzeddin to the east, low down on a slope about four miles outside Suda. The Greek main camp at Alicanu lies in a hollow visible from Soubashy, at a distance of perhaps ten miles, but the Insurgents have lately massed themselves in considerable force at various points in turn on both sides of the main ridge, surrounding and attacking the blockhouses one after another, until they had almost aII fallen into their hands, leaving only the two principal forts still in possession of the Turks. After the assault and capture of Malaxa and Keratidi they determined to storm Soubashy, but were prevented by the International troops occupying it on the very day which they had intended to commence the attack. They then concentrated all their efforts on Fort Izzeddin, and Monday [29th March] last commenced firing, being, however, kept in check by the shells of an Italian cruiser.
The Admirals then decided to reinforce the Turkish garrison of six hundred men by five hundred mixed troops, the whole force to be under the command of Major Bor. On Tuesday [30th March], however, it was discovered that the insurgents had occupied a ruined monastery and some stonework within a few hundred yards of the Turkish blockhouse above Fort Izzeddin [Aptera].
Here a short description of the ground is necessary. The Fort is placed about one hundred feet above the sea, and is armed with twelve Krupp, fifteen-centimetre guns, one of eight centimetres, and two Nordenfelts. There was ample ammunition for all except the Nordenfelts, which only had about four hundred rounds. Of all these guns, however, only two were available against a land attack, the Fort having been built to cover the entrance to Suda Bay. About a quarter of a mile off, on the summit of the hill where it begins to slope down to Izzeddin, is a strong blockhouse, with two Krupp guns eight-centimetre guns outside it, and two Nordenfelts within. Each of these forts had three hundred men. The Turks from the blockhouse had thrown up an earthwork about three hundred yards in advance, where they had placed about twenty men. The Insurgents in their monastery were quite close to this post, whilst the main body of them were camped a little further off, behind a very strong old stone wall and a natural rampart of rock. This position was. perhaps, three-quarters of a mile from tie Fort itself, and the slope from the ridge to the sea, especially along the edge of a ravine which cleft the hill side, was sown thick with sharpshooters.
To return to the story after this digression, the Insurgents commenced a night attack on Tuesday [30th March], and were shelled by several of the small ships, and by one or two rounds from the larger vessels, I believe, up till midnight. It is doubtful, however, if the shells did much damage, as the search lights were found to be more useful to the Insurgents than to the defence, and were ordered to be discontinued. The Ardent was fired at directly she turned on her light, and I was shown one of several bullets which struck her. Meanwhile, Major Bor, who had, together with the Austrian Admiral, inspected the position on Tuesday afternoon, expressed his opinion that it was imperatively necessary to drive the Insurgents out of their advanced position and to occupy it, otherwise it was easy for them to concentrate any number of men unseen. He, therefore, proposed that an International force of five hundred should on the next day storm the Insurgent camp, and drew up a plan of operations, whereby the five companies were to advance in line with certain distances between; bayonets were not to be fixed until within two hundred yards of the position, &c.
The Admirals met next morning to consider this plan, but two of them objected to taking the offensive, and, as a matter of fact, even before they had commenced their conference firing was general down at the point.
I rode over to Suda early, but on trying to get a boat to take me down to the scene was met by great reluctance. At last one boatman picked up his rifle and said he would take me if I would use an oar, and off we went. This was soon after eight o’clock, and at that time the forts were firing occasionally, whilst the Turkish frigate and the Ardent seemed to be the most-busy of the others. It took us the best part of an hour ‘s hard rowing to come opposite the fight, but it well worth the trouble. At about nine the Turkish vessel sheered off, and the grey Russian armoured gunboat, the Groziastchy, ranged up to within about three hundred yards of the shore, and, slowly drifting backwards and forwards, proceeded to pour in a most destructive fire, directed principally at wo old stone wall at the head of the ravine, with also an occasional shell at the Monastery where the Greeks had hoisted a flag upon which the Turks had ref trained from firing, until ordered to do so by the Admirals, on the ground that it was a sacred edifice, though long since in ruins. The Russian practice was excellent, every shell bursting against or at the foot of the wall which was finally knocked into a heap of rubbish. The Insurgents, nevertheless, did not seem to care much, and as soon as they were driven from one shelter, they swarmed into another, generally acknowledging any particularly accurate shell by a stiffer volley at the Turks.
The whole of the slope was now covered with Insurgents, lying down mostly and firing at their ease, now and again advancing a short way again to crouch and fire. From the crest down to the cliff the gorse and grass might also have been on fire, so covered were they with perpetual puffs of smoke, and the rattle of the rifles never ceased its accompaniment to the boom of the guns every minute of so. At about half-past nine the Austrian Tiger, a large armoured cruiser, relieved the Groziastchy with rather heavier metal, though it did not seem to me to make quite such good practice. I do not mention the calibre of the respective guns for fear of making a mistake, but anybody whom it interests can look them up in “Brassey.” [An authorative British illustrated guide to the naval forces of the world.] It was about half-past nine, or perhaps a little later, when a roar from the distance showed that one of the big ships in the bay had joined in, and the glasses told it was the Camperdown, which was lying the farthest out, and consequently the nearest to the fort, although at a distance of nearly four miles. Several of her shells seemed to go over the hill, and probably were very useful there, but one or two (I believe six-inch).
HMS Camperdown in action 31st March 1897. Illustration by courtesy of the artist, Iain Lowe
By about ten o’clock the Tiger and the Groziastchy were hard at it, but with apparently no effect on the morale of the Insurgents, who kept up their fire most gallantly. Though it appeared to me that the Turks had evacuated their advanced earthwork, I should not like to be sure of it, at any rate, beyond that there did not seem to be much damage on either side, and the blockhouse was holding its own comfortably. Probably, however, it was enabled to do this from the manner in which the Insurgents were being harassed by the shells. While I was wondering how long this might continue, a terrific crash shook the air followed by a hissing and groaning overhead, and then by an explosion at the head of the ravine.
The din beggars description, being multiplied a hundred- fold by the mountains on every side, which sent back a splitting echo. This was one of the white twins, familiarly known as “Long Toms,” from the Camperdown barbette. In perhaps less than a minute came a second, also right in the centre of the position. Each shell raised such a dust and smoke, that the actual results could not be made out: but the Insurgents could be seen hurriedly pulling down their two flags, picking up their rifles, covering their heads with their cloaks and disappearing over the ridge. Two more of these monsters completed the rout, and practically put an end to the incident. Nevertheless, a number of sharpshooters remained on the slope after the main body had departed under a couple of shrapnels from the Tiger, which were the last shells fired at a quarter past ten.
As soon as the Insurgent flag was down, about a hundred and fifty Turks sallied forth, and, opening into one long line, advanced over the slope, keeping their formation well, and, as far as I could see, not replying to the fire of the Insurgents who had remained, but who were gradually cleared off, now one and then another jumping up like a hare and making for the ravine, up which he doubtless rejoined his comrades. By half-past ten the Turks had swept the whole hillside and planted their own flags on the Monastery and at the head of the ravine, dancing with delight, and firing their rifles in the air.
The ships, having done their business, steamed slowly out to sea to continue the blockade, and I landed to see the result of the fire. My boatman, however, objected, saying that if we did not return at once he did not know when we should be able to do so, as a head wind had sprung up and was freshening. As it was too great a risk to run the chance of being stranded up the coast, we started back, and after a very weary hour and a-half struggle against the waves, we made the hospitable Revenge, in whose ward-room the whole bombardment was fought over again. Before leaving the fort, however, a general action seemed to have begun afresh, and the Insurgents, if driven off, did not, evidently, consider themselves beaten. The Turks will, nevertheless, be now able probably to hold their own easily, and such was the opinion of the Admirals, who yesterday afternoon abandoned the idea of a mixed occupation, only ordering a Turkish reinforcement. The Turks lost three killed and five wounded The Insurgent loss can only be known later.
Whilst on this subject, I may add that all Turks here, military and common folk, are furious over the Malaxa affair. The military attribute the blame to Edhem Pacha’s having ordered the convoy to return the day before, the other officers declaring that they could easily have revictualled it. They also say that the Commandant never intended to surrender, and his white flag was only a signal for a parley, but that the Cretans at once came down in force, and this more or less surprised him. Even then he only surrendered by the advice given to him, very sensibly, by a newspaper Correspondent, [Mr. Bass, an American Correspondent] who undoubtedly saved the lives of them all.
London Evening Standard. Tuesday 13 April 1897
CANEA, April 2 [1897]
Some of the Insurgents to-day fired about fifteen rifle shots at the Butsunaria blockhouse, now occupied by a mixed foreign garrison. The guns of the Italian troops fired six shots in reply, and the Insurgents, who appeared to be in considerable force, thereupon retired. The Turkish prisoners of Colonel Vassos will arrive in Canea to-morrow morning. Three Greek prisoners at Akrotiri have been released. The following is a summary of a letter ad- dressed by the Bishop of Canea to the Christian nations of Europe: —
” For a long time this country has shed its blood in the straggle to escape from tyranny, and to unite with Greece. In the name of the safety of the Cretan people, who are the victims of so many massacres, and who are determined to obtain this union, put a stop to the bombardment, and do not oppose their unanimous wish. The Turks, on the other hand, are free to act against the Christians, and are even supported by the Great Powers. The conduct of the Great Towers reduces the Christians to despair. May a better appreciation of the facts bring about a change in their policy. I appeal to the sentiment of justice and liberty of the Christian nations of Europe to lead to a modification of the attitude of their Governments. I also thank those who made common cause with my compatriots, for their cause is the cause of the whole of humanity. (Signed) ” Nicephoros.”
The day before yesterday [31st March], while the Austrian troops were occupying the Tsikalaria Heights, I went with a colleague representing a New York journal to the Malaxa Hill, which commands the whole Aptera Plateau and rises above the blockhouse protecting Fort Izzedin, on the mountain side. Our object was to gain some details from personal inquiry regarding the bombardment of that position. We were well received by the Insurgents, who said that a small party did, in fact, attack and occupy the blockhouse in question. A bombardment first of all from the Turkish men-of-war and then by the guns of the International Fleet forced them to evacuate the position, which was at once occupied by the Ottoman troops.
On the 30th March more than eighty shots were fired by the ships’ guns. Several houses in the adjacent villages were set on fire, and, according to the Insurgents, this was almost entirely the work of the Turkish troops, who have now planted their standard on the ruins of the Aptera Monastery, which is the property of the Patmos Convent. My companion and myself ascended the next ridge, from which we could see a number of houses enveloped in thick smoke. Not a single soldier was visible except near the Monastery.
On returning to the village of Malaxa, we had further talk with the Insurgent leaders. They said they knew nothing of the Proclamation of the Admirals calling upon them to cease hostilities. They added, however, that they would only obey the orders of Greece. The Chiefs were full of loud denunciation of the Great Powers, which wanted to deprive them of the right to fight for their freedom; but they were all prepared to die rather than yield, even though the Greek troops, overborne by the pressure of the Six Powers arrayed against their country, should have to return to the Piraeus. The Insurgents suffered little from the bombardment. Their only loss was two killed and four men very slightly wounded, among whom were two standard bearers, the one a so-called deserter from the Greek Army, M. Chondalis, and the other a Cretan engineer, M. Emmanuel Kilaides.
The day following the bombardment, viz., March 31, another Insurgent was killed. We passed the night in the village of Condopoulos, where we were very hospitably entertained by another Greek deserter, Lieutenant Rizzis. On April I we rode to Alikianu, passing on our way through Panaghia. A Deputy from Sphakia, M. Paliogeorgaki, accompanied us, and on the road we met Prince Mourouzi. The Insurgents at Alikianu talked of the action of the Powers, and of their resolve to die fighting, just in the same way as their comrades at Malaxa. The French cruiser Bugeaud yesterday went round to Suda Bay.
On arrival in Crete in March 1897, one of the many problems faced by British troops was gaining access to drinking water. With Candia’s water supply on occasion under threat from insurgents breaching the aqueduct, and anyway being of doubtful quality, securing a constant supply of potable water proved to be a considerable strain on the resources of the Royal Navy. With 1½ gallons per man and 10 gallons per animal daily being the laid down requirement, it was necessary at one stage to use the Cunard liner S.S. Samaria, on hire to bring in a Mountain Battery from Malta, to anchor off Candia in order to supply the 3,000 or gallons per day required, and to supply tank-boats to transport the water into the harbour, the Samaria having too great a draught to enter.[1] To further complicate matters, the British Admiralty then suggested that the War Office pay for the hire since it appeared to them to be a ‘military service’ they were supplying to the Army.[2] The matter was resolved by the use of the hired vessel SS Turquoise as a distillation vessel, anchored inside the harbour walls in Candia.
Built in Glasgow by John Shearer and Sons and launched in 1893, the Turquoise was a 165 foot long, 590 dwt, iron and steel, screw driven general coaster and hired out to the Navy by its owners, Walker Henderson and Company.[3] According to the records of Lloyds of London, she was surveyed in the Port of London on 22 September 1897 immediately prior to going to Crete, and then again in H.M. Dockyard Chatham on 4 May 1899 upon her return. On this occasion the distilling apparatus was removed.[4]
As it turned out, the Turquoise was to play a part in ensuring the survival of, not only the troops to whom it supplied drinking water, but also the men stranded within the harbour during the rioting on 6th September 1898.
According to contemporary accounts, the British troops who had been at the Town gate entrance to the harbour when the fighting started, sailors from H.M.S. Hazard and soldiers of 1/Highland Light Infantry, on being forced to retreat from the gate, were split into two groups. One party retreated to, and were trapped in and around, the Dime, the Customs House they had been attempting to take over. The other group were forced to make their way from the Town gate along the harbour mole to the relative safety of the Turquoise, moored almost immediately across the harbour, opposite the Dime. Here the men held out for several hours, under fire all the time from Bashi Bazouks on the harbour wall and in the houses across the harbour.
Candia map. Events 6 September 1898. FO78 4934Candia map The Globe 16 September 1898
There appear to be no descriptions of what occurred on board the Turquoise during the riot, but there exist several accounts of her role in the immediate aftermath.
“The Turquoise, condensing ship, was moored in the port, and she had to disconnect her distillers and couple up her engines before moving. The Governor [Edem Pasha] gave safe conduct to the British to go round the port and on board the Turquoise, but no help was given with the wounded…Refugees began to arrive on board, and when finally the Turquoise steamed out, her upper deck was covered with wounded and dead, and also with frightened Cretans, including half-a-dozen women and some babies and children.”[5]
“Firing on both sides stopped at once. We got the wounded into the boats first and made the Turkish soldiers row them over to the Turquoise, which had got up steam. We then marched round the harbour to her and all got on board. She then steamed out of the harbour.”[6]
“They did not succeed in getting the Turquoise out of the harbour until ten o’clock. They found then that she had four bluejackets, four soldiers, and one officer dead on board, and nearly 70 wounded, of whom 10 were bluejackets and over 50 soldiers, the remainder being Christian refugees.” [7]
“The [H.M.S.] Astraea (Captain Berry) arrived after midnight…All that could be done was to send assistance to the “Turquoise” where Dr. Maillard was singlehanded and the relief party who boarded her with surgical materials and food and clothing at 2 a.m. had a busy night’s work, continued till past daybreak. The Captain of the Turquoise [Captain Richard Shaw] rendering valuable help… [The following day, 7th September] The Turquoise was cleared of her wounded, who went on board the war vessels, and she then steamed out to the open sea, and buried the dead there. ”[8]
Although no British civilians were granted any formal award for their bravery on that day, in recognition of the part played by (civilian) Captain Richard Shaw of the Turquoise in keeping the men safe, the Admiralty presented him with a silver cup, now in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Cup presented to Captain Shaw by the Admiralty.
According to the NMM website, “the cup has acanthus leaf decoration on the base of the bowl and on the lid and loop handles, and a border of scrolling foliage around the top of the bowl. It stands on a round foot decorated with a border of leaves, and the tall lid has a fir-cone finial. The cup is gilt on the inside. The side of the bowl is inscribed ‘PRESENTED BY THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY TO Captain Richard Shaw OF THE STEAMSHIP “Turquoise” in recognition of his valuable services to Her Majesty’s Naval and Military Forces at Kandia, Crete, on the 6th September 1898’. The foot is inscribed ‘ELKINGTON & CO LTD SILVERSMITHS TO THE QUEEN, 22 REGENT ST LONDON'”
On return from Crete in 1899, the Turquoise reverted to her previous role as a general cargo carrier.
On 2 July 1915 she was taken over by the Royal Navy and commissioned as Fleet messenger No.30,[9] and it was as such she met her doom on 31 July 1915. On this occasion two Admiralty fleet messengers sailing in company from Glasgow under sealed orders, bound for Dardanelles, were sunk by U.28 (Kapitänleutnant Georg-Günther Freiherr von Forstner). In the afternoon that day, the Turquoise, flying the naval Pennant No. Y4.30, with a crew of 15 under the command of Lt. John Mc Nicol RNR, sighted the U.28 surfaced on starboard bow. The submarine rapidly approached and ordered Turquoise to stop. The Turquoise refused to do so, but attempted to ram the U.28, which opened fire at around 1600, making several hits. The Turquois was immediately abandoned and sank at 1615, 60 miles SW of The Scillies. The chief engineer was killed by gunfire and two crew wounded; however, the survivors were picked up by a patrol trawler and landed at St Mary’s the next day. The accompanying vessel, SS Nugget, was sunk later that evening by the U.28.[10]
U.28. Photographs taken from the deck of one of her prizes.
The U.28 in action. Photographs taken from the deck of one of her victims.[11]
Post Scripts.
The self-sinking submarine.
From 1 August 1914 to 14 June 1916, U.28 was under the command of Kapitänleutnant Von Forstner and had a very successful career, sinking 24 ships, capturing two and damaging a further two.[12] Her successes continued under different commanders until 2 September 1917. On this day, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Georg Schmidt, while off the northern coast of Norway she attacked and sank the S.S. Olive Branch,[13] sinking herself in the process! Unfortunately for the U.28, the Olive Branch was carrying supplies and munitions to Russia and when, having hit the Olive Branch with a torpedo, the U.28 closed in to complete her destruction with gunfire, a shell from the submarine exploded the ammunition. According to differing accounts, the blast of the explosion either destroyed the submarine outright, or blew a lorry being carried as deck cargo into the air which then landed on the submarine, sinking her. Either way, she went down with all hands.
The submarine and the Sea Monster
In 1933, by now long promoted and retired, Korvettenkapitän Von Forstnergave an account of an encounter which he alleged occurred the day before the U.28 sank the Turquoise. Speaking to a German newspaper he stated: “On July 30, 1915, our U-28 torpedoed the British steamer Iberian, which was carrying a rich cargo across the North Atlantic. The steamer sank so swiftly that its bow stuck up almost vertically into the air. Moments later the hull of the Iberian disappeared. The wreckage remained beneath the water for approximately twenty-five seconds, at a depth that was clearly impossible to assess, when suddenly there was a violent explosion, which shot pieces of debris – among them a gigantic aquatic animal – out of the water to a height of approximately 80-feet. “At that moment I had with me in the conning tower six of my officers of the watch, including the chief engineer, the navigator, and the helmsman. Simultaneously we all drew one another´s attention to this wonder of the seas, which was writhing and struggling among the debris. We were unable to identify the creature, but all of us agreed that it resembled an aquatic crocodile, which was about 60-feet long, with four limbs resembling large webbed feet, a long, pointed tail and a head which also tapered to a point. Unfortunately, we were not able to take a photograph, for the animal sank out of sight after ten or fifteen seconds.” [14]
Artists impression of the U. 28 ‘Sea Monster’.
Fortunately for the current writer’s sanity, this account has been thoroughly debunked by the Fortean Times, while an interesting take on the ‘evolution’ of the illustration of the mythical monster can be found here.
[1] ADM 116/88. No. 95, Admiralty to Commander in Chief Malta 15 April 1897, Harris to Admiralty un-numbered, 18 April 1897 and response appended to telegram Harris to Director of Transport Admiralty 20 April 1897.
[2] ADM 116/88. No. 141. Commander in Chief Malta to Admiralty 10 April 1897.
[6] The People. 2 October 1898, p.18. From internal evidence this is from an account written by one of the crew of H.M.S. Hazard who was one of the original landing party present in the Dime throughout the events of 6th September.
[7] The Rugby Advertiser. 20 September 1898, p.2. ‘The following account of the fighting at Candia is from a private letter written on board H.M.S. Astraea which been sent to the Times with permission to publish. The letter is dated Candia, September 9.’
The difficulty of extracting the truth about what was going on in Crete in 1897 is illustrated by the following two articles, each describing the same event. The first was a formal report written by Rear-Admiral Harris, Senior British Naval Officer in Crete, describing a failed attempt by Cretan Christians to capture the Malaxa blockhouse. The second was a report of the same event written by an unnamed British reporter.
‘On Sunday 28th [February] the insurgents, about 200 strong, attacked the blockhouse held by the Turks on the hill near Malaxa. About 11 A.M., the attack having been renewed, the Greeks being in considerable force, the Turkish commander requested permission to open fire from the “Mukaddemi Khair,” [Mukaddeme-i Hayir] which was permitted by the Admirals, as the Greek flag had been much advanced towards the blockhouse, and a spirited attack on it was being made, in defiance of the Proclamation of the Admirals that offensive operations would not be allowed.
The “Mukaddfemi Khair” fired three shells, the first a well-directed one, which had the effect of rapidly clearing the hill-sides.
The cause of the fighting appears to have been due to a Turkish relief party having left Canea during the night to revictual the blockhouse, which had been for some eight or ten days without provisions.
Having succeeded in their object, the party commenced to return, but were observed by the insurgents, who opened heavy fire on them. They, however, succeeded in regaining the Turkish lines, leaving the insurgents making a strong attack on the blockhouse.
As an outcome of this, the villages of Chacalaria and Nerokori were destroyed by fire, but which party was responsible for the incendiarism it is impossible to find out with any degree of certainty.’[1]
Compare with:
‘Some further particulars have arrived regarding the fighting at Malaxa. The block-house there is situated above the village of Trikalaria, and the Christians have been blockading the Turkish garrison for some days, cutting them off from all supplies.
To-day a body of Turks with a detachment of Nizams, or Ottoman regular troops, left Canea with convoy to revictual the fort. The Cretan insurgents disputed the passage of the convoy and attacked the escort. Some of the Turks and Nizams were killed. Turkish frigate thereupon opened fire and threw two shells in the direction of the insurgent force. By order of the foreign war-vessels the Turkish man-of-war then ceased firing. In the end the Turkish convoy had to retire to Canea. The fighting between the besieged garrison and the Cretans, however, continues. The villages of Trikalaria and Nerokouro were set on fire by Bashi-Bazouks.’[2]
Ignoring the relatively minor matters of the number of shells fired by the Mukaddeme-i Hayirand the fact that it wasn’t a ‘frigate’ but an iron-clad battle ship, two main issues are highlighted by the differing reports. In the one from the British Admiral Harris, he makes it clear that the Mukaddeme-i Hayir opened fire with the permission of the Admirals and makes no reference to the vessel being ‘ordered’ to cease firing. The complete opposite is implied in the newspaper report. This omits the fact that the Ottoman vessel had the permission of the Powers to commence firing and suggests that it only cease when ordered to do so by the Admirals. (One can only imagine the feelings of the Captain of the Mukaddeme-i Hayir, having to obtain permission from foreign Powers to open fire in support of Ottoman troops, being attacked on what was still then de jure Ottoman territory, by forces rebelling against Ottoman rule.)
The second point to note is the attribution of blame for the burning of the two villages. Admiral Harris states that it’s impossible to correctly allocate the blame for staring the fires; the St James Gazette reporter is adamant that the fire was started by Bashi-Bazouks – Ottoman, Cretan-Muslim, irregular forces.
What is also of interest is that Harris’ account would have been read by relatively few, albeit possibly influential, people, whereas the newspaper account was widely circulated and syndicated in British newspapers of the day.
So, which one is telling the ‘truth’?
Feth i Bülend sister ship to Mukaddeme-i Hayr (1869)Mukaddeme-i Hayir during refit in Constantinople in 1895.
[1] Parliamentary Command paper C.8429. Turkey. No. 9 (1897). Reports on the situation in Crete. Inc. 2. p.8. Rear Admiral Harris to Admiral J.O. Hopkins, 4 March 1897.
The confused state of inter-communal relations on Crete in February 1897 was illustrated by the situation faced by Commander C. L. Ottley, Captain of H.M.S. Nymphe, a composite screw sloop.
Arriving off Sitia on 11th February 1897 he was informed by both the Kaimakam, the Ottoman appointed town governor, and the Italian Eastern Telegraph Company operator that the town was in a state of panic; Christian insurrectionists surrounding the town and its inhabitants, both Christians and Muslims, each fearing that the others were about to attack them. Ottley initially interviewed Muslim leaders, finding:
“[I]n some ways remarkable as a complete reversal of the very prevalent idea, that it is only the Christians in Crete, who have reason to dread the indiscriminate massacre of their men, women and children at the hands of Musselmens.”
At a later interview with Christian chieftains, it was they who expressed their fear of massacre. Ottley eventually arranged for women and children of each religion to be placed in separate caiques moored alongside H. M. S. Nymphe, under the protection of her guns.[1]On the 14th February, landing under a flag of truce and delivering a message to the insurrectionists from the consuls in Canea to the effect that they would be held responsible for any unlawful acts committed by their men, Ottley arranged for Christian and Muslim chiefs to meet in his cabin to organise a 48 hour armistice. His justification for the breach of orders ‘not to get involved as an intermediary’ [2], was that there was considerable British and foreign property at risk in the town, and there were no European consuls present:
“Several of the principal local functionaries have fled, including the Kaimaken,[sic] and so far as I am aware, the Captain of the Port. The Head of the judicial branch of the government here has, I am informed, gone mad (he yesterday murdered a Mussleman woman).”
His efforts to broker a cease fire were successful and the situation within the town remained calm pending the arrival of Ottoman and European (French in this case) troops to keep the peace.[3]
H.M.S. Nymphe c. 1896.
Foot notes.
[1] National Archive, Admiralty Papers. ADM 116/89, Crete – Letters from C. In C. Mediterranean. No. 32. Commander Otley to Rear Admiral Harris, 14 February 1897.
[2] ]bid.
[3] National Archive, Admiralty papers. ADM 116/89, Crete – Letters from C. In C. Mediterranean. No. 33. Commander Otley to Rear Admiral Harris, 16 February 1897.
Among the documents held at the National Archive in Kew is a file catalogued as ADM116/88. This is an Admiralty file containing telegrams to and from the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and the Admiralty in London, relating to the Royal Navy’s involvement in Crete between February and November 1897. In an indication of the scale of the British involvement in Crete in this relatively short period, a handwritten note on the inside of the file lists all the Royal Navy’s ships that are referred to in the correspondence. The list shows that in a ten-month period at least 26 RN vessels, ranging from state-of-the-art Battleships to Store ships, were active in Cretan waters. This list does not include troop ships. However, while the commitment of 26 vessels to operations in Crete may seem a large number, many of them were on station for a matter of days only, and it needs to be remembered that in June 1897 at the time of the Spithead Review celebrating Queen Victoria’s Jubilee, the Royal Navy had some 212 ships in commission[1]; it currently has 75.
List of ships referred to in ADM 116/88.
Royal Navy ships.
HMS Anson Admiral Class Battleship
HMS Ardent Ardent Class Destroyer
HMS Banshee Banshee Class Destroyer
HMS Barfleur Centurion Class Battleship
HMS Boxer Ardent Class Destroyer
HMS Bruiser Ardent Class Destroyer
HMS Cambrian Astraea Class Protected Cruiser
HMS Camperdown Admiral Class Battleship
HMS Dragon Banshee Class Destroyer Lieutenant William F. Blunt
HMS Dryad Dryad Class Torpedo Gunboat
HMS Fearless Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser Commander Charles E. Gladstone
HMS Harrier Dryad Class Torpedo Gunboat
HMS Hawke Edgar Class Protected Cruiser
HMS Nile Trafalgar Class Battleship
HMS Nymphe Nymphe Class Composite Screw Sloop
HMS Revenge Royal Sovereign Class battleship
HMS Rodney Admiral Class Battleship
HMS Royal Oak Royal Sovereign Class Battleship
HMS Scout Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser
HMS Scylla Apollo Class Second-Class Cruiser Captain Percy M. Scott
HMS Trafalgar Trafalgar Class Battleship
HMS Tyne Store Ship
Torpedo Boat 90 TB88 Class
Torpedo Boats 94, 95 & 96 TB94 Class
Civilian vessels
SS Clyde (Transport)
SS Samaria (Transport and billeting)
HMS Anson. Admiral Class Battleship.
HMS Ardent. Ardent Class Destroyer.
HMS Banshee. Banshee Class Destroyer.
HMS Banshee in heavy weather.
HMS Barfleur. Centurian Class Battleship.
HMS Boxer. Ardent Class Destroyer.
HMS Bruizer/Bruiser. Ardent Class Destroyer.
HMS Cambrian 1910. Astraea Class protected Cruiser.
Astraea Class cruiser
HMS Camperdown. Admiral Class battleship.
HMS Dryad. Dryad Class Torpedo Gunboat.
HMS Dryad after conversion to minesweeper
HMS Dryad. Dryad Class Torpedo Gunboat.
HMS Fearless. Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser.
HMS Hawke. Edgar Class, First Class Protected Cruiser.
HMS Hawke. Edgar Class, First Class Protected Cruiser.
Edgar Class Protected Cruiser.
HMS Nile. Trafalgar Class Battleship.
HMS Nymphe. Nymphe Class Composite Screw Sloop.
HMS Revenge. Royal Soverign Class battleship.
HMS Rodney. Admiral Class Battleship.
HMS Royal Oak. Royal Soverign Class Battleship.
HMS Royal Oak. Royal Soverign Class Battleship.
HMS Scout. Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser.
HMS Scout. Scout Class Torpedo Cruiser.
HMS Scylla. Apollo Class, 2nd Class Protected Cruiser.
In April 1897, Mrs Ormiston Chant journeyed to Crete from Britain to offer aid to the Greek forces on the island. In her rationale for going to Crete, Mrs Ormiston Chant stated that one of her reasons was that she had heard that “…the sisters of the Greek Red Cross brigade had been unable to effect a landing in Crete owing to the blockade.”
In fact, Mrs. Ormiston Chant’s information on the situation in Crete was wrong in one vital aspect: While the European embargo on Crete did indeed prevent Greek, and Ottoman, vessels landing for the purposes of assisting either side in the fighting, it did not prevent the landing of either Doctors or medical supplies under the flag of the Red Cross, as British naval records show.[1]
The offer of European medical assistance to the Cretan Christian insurgents was also reported in the Penny Illustrated Newspaper which stated that that “ On the 11th March three doctors – English, French and Russian – paid a visit to the “insurgent” position, and operated on a badly wounded “insurgent,” giving medical treatment to others wounded.”[2]
This was followed two weeks later by a more detailed report: “Our Doctors labour to alleviate physical pain in the darkest slums of London, our philanthropic readers are well aware. British naval surgeons, with the same splendid devotion to duty, have, we rejoice to learn, landed at various stations in the Island of Crete, not without considerable risk to their lives, braving the danger of being shot at, as plucky Admiral Harris was in Suda Bay; and those valiant disciples of Esculapius have been fortunately enabled to dress the wounds of the “insurgents” particularly after the much-to be regretted engagement at Akrotiri, which was followed by the prompt disarming of the Bashi-Bazouks, we were glad to learn.”[3]
British naval surgeons offering aid to Cretan Christian insurgents. Penny Illustrated Paper. 17 April 1897.
On a less specific and more general level, British forces were active throughout their stay in Crete in promoting the welfare of the local population; albeit mostly as a by-product of maintaining and improving the health of British troops. (However, there were other occasions when British naval surgeons were more interested in describing ailments than curing them!)
[1] ADM 116/89 Despatch dated 19 March 1897. Inclosure No.59. Captain Coustance to Rear Admiral Harris, 28 February 1897.
The British in Crete, 1896 to 1913. 